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The cognitive sciences and their method:  
a physicist’s perspective
Introduction: explaining physics
Every physicist would like to know why is it that he or she can do physics and 
what it precisely means. The fact that physics constitutes a doable enterprise 
has been debated mostly by those who show more sensitivity to what physics 
studies beyond a mere acknowledgement of physics’ main task of explaining 
and predicting natural phenomena by means of physical laws. Physical the-
ories such as quantum mechanics and general theory of relativity are highly 
successful and there are precise reasons for this state of affairs.1 Normally, 
a physicist will have a very good understanding of such mathematical notions 
as a derivative, an integral or more complex ones such as, e.g., functional spaces 
and differentiable manifolds. But this does not answer the questions how it is 
that these ideas can be had by a physicist.
Philosophy yields a spectrum of responses to this matter known as the 
problem of the universals.2 None of them, however, is satisfactory for each even-
1 Cf. E. P. Wigner, The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, 
“Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics” 1960 no. 13, p. 1–14. 
2 Cf. A. A. Maurer, Medieval philosophy, Toronto 1982, p. 61–65. For the analysis of the 
contemporary revival of the problem of universals see: W.V.O. Quine, On what there is, ”Review 
of Metaphysics” 1948 vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 21–38.
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tually rests on a priori philosophical assumptions. Consequently, much hope 
is now seen in the cognitive sciences to provide explanations why, for instance, 
mathematical platonism is such a vivid stance among physicists.3 The famous 
case of Roger Penrose is but the best example of a thinker whose theoretical 
speculation is heavily influenced by the platonic doctrine. In order to justify his 
claims, Penrose resorts to the notion of intuition as a cognitive power involving 
an immediate insight into an atemporal universe of the mathematical truth.4 
Cognitive sciences, on the other hand, cast serious doubt on the possibility 
of intuitive knowledge.5 In sum, a contemporary physicist should demonstrate 
considerable interest in the progress of cognitive sciences for two reasons: 
(1) they may shed important light on the process of formulation of physical 
theories and (2) physical theories are frequently resorted to as one attempts 
to study mental phenomena (e.g., quantum models of the mind).
Can a physicist offer anything to the cognitive sciences in return? The pri-
mary goal of the presented article is to demonstrate why the answer to this 
question is in positive. A physicist seems to have a somewhat privileged po-
sition for he or she exercises a scientific discipline characterized by a most 
transparent and best analyzed methodology. In brief, the progress of physics 
always involves the combination of the theoretical prediction with an exper-
iment. Physics brings its fruit when an appropriate mathematical structure 
is discovered (some say guessed) leading to the explanation of a large class 
of phenomena and to the prediction of radically new effects. It is precisely the 
growing importance of cognitive sciences that awakens physicist’s methodo-
logical instincts and prompts him or her to put the methodological intricacies 
of cognitive sciences in a physicist’s perspective. In particular, two areas of in-
quiry are singled out: (1) the interdisciplinary character of cognitive sciences 
and their conceptual basis and (2) the experimental methods in cognitive 
sciences that have physics as their basis. Reflecting upon these two areas will 
lead to the better understanding how knowledge is acquired in the cognitive 
sciences both by means of their theoretical foundations and the experimental 
evidence.
3 Cf. B. Davies, Some recent articles about platonism, “EMS Newsletter” 2009 no. 64, p. 24–27.
4 R. Penrose, The road to reality, New York 2005, p. 7–23; Cf. D. Mumford, Why I am a platonist, 
“EMS Newsletter” 2008 no. 70, p. 27–30.
5 Cf. L. Cosmides, J. Tooby, Beyond intuition and instinct blindness. Toward an evolutionarily 
rigorous cognitive science, “Cognition” 1994 no. 50, p. 41–77.
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Conceptual intricacies of the cognitive sciences
Although physics splits into many sub-disciplines such as classical mechanics, 
thermodynamics, electrodynamics, quantum field theory, solid state theory and 
others, it constitutes a well unified body of knowledge. This is achieved by the 
use of mathematics as its primary method as well as a common conceptual 
basis that builds into the mathematical equations expressing the physical laws. 
Such notions as space, time (more correctly space-time) and field lie at the root 
of each physical theory. Several spectacular unifications have been achieved 
in physics where disparate theoretical frameworks merged into a generalized 
scheme. For instance, the unification of Galilean mechanics with the theory 
of electromagnetism led to the introduction of the notion of spacetime in the 
special theory of relativity thereby revealing the limited character of space 
and time treated separately. This shows a very important mechanism of the 
scientific progress where the common sense concepts that have migrated from 
philosophy to physics lose their applicability as the theory needs to explain 
a larger class of phenomena. In particular, the notions of space and time in the 
special relativity theory can be considered to be phenomenological (emergent) 
for velocities small compared to the velocity of light. Similarly, it is expected 
that the notion of spacetime might disappear entirely in the theory of quantum 
gravity and that spacetime will only emerge in the low energy limit.6
As a physicist turns the attention to the cognitive sciences, he or she immedi-
ately notices the diverse conceptual bases of the contributing disciplines. This 
is typical for an interdisciplinary field of study. Inasmuch as the different branch-
es of physics rely to a considerable degree on a common conceptual basis, the 
different components of the cognitive sciences seem to be speaking conceptually 
disjoint languages. The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences names a range 
the contributing disciplines that include: (1) philosophy of mind, (2) neurosci-
ence, (3) linguistic studies, (4) cultural studies, (5) psychology and (6) com-
putational intelligence.7 Such a situation calls for an in-depth methodological 
analysis for the evident interdisciplinary character of the cognitive sciences 
makes the justification of its inferences a bit more complex as it is in physics.
6 J. Butterfield, C. Isham, Spacetime and the philosophical challenge of quantum gravity, [in:] 
Physics meets philosophy at the planck scale, ed. C. Callender, N. Huggett, Cambridge, MA 2001, 
p. 33–89.
7 The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences, ed. R. A. Wilson, F. C. Keil, Cambridge, MA 1999.
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Literature offers several valuable studies that undertake the effort to clar-
ify the relations between the contributing disciplines within the cognitive 
sciences.8 Most naturally, this is achieved in the perspective of the so called 
philosophy in science program pioneered by Michael Heller.9 Although the 
content of the cognitive sciences specified above includes philosophy on the 
same footing with others, the philosophy in science program permits to reveal 
a structure of relationships that occur between the different disciplines. The 
program has been shown to be extremely fruitful in physics as it allowed for 
a deepened understanding of its development with special emphasis on its ties 
with philosophy, especially in regards to the exchange and refinement of some 
common sense notions operative in the philosophical discourse. This process 
was illustrated above with the notion of space-time as the primary example.
The authors of the publications referred to above, namely, Wojciech Gry-
giel, Łukasz Kurek and Bartosz Brożek, present different attempts to locate 
the enterprise of the cognitive sciences in the perspective of the philosophy 
of science program. Although the main starting point is the original tripartite 
relation between philosophy and science, the authors diverge in their focus 
on the range of the contributing disciplines that they wish to reflect upon. 
In my article, I concentrated on the cognitive sciences in their entire complexity 
and I proceeded to map out in more detail the relation between philosophy 
and the other disciplines as it is proper for the method of philosophy in physics. 
Interestingly enough, it turns out that similarly to physics, philosophy of mind 
understood as the pre-scientific legacy of the efforts to understand mind and 
its cognitive powers (e.g., folk psychology or epistemology), carries with 
it most of the vital questions that are studied by the strictly scientific branch-
es of the cognitive sciences. These include sensation, emotions, qualia, free 
will, consciousness, abstract thinking, formation of concepts and many others.
It must be remembered, however, that philosophy of mind thus understood 
heavily relies on the strictly philosophical stance of the mind-body dualism. 
The body is the material substance of the brain while the mind is an imma-
terial entity responsible for the cognitive functions such as reason and free 
8 W. P. Grygiel, Metodologiczne aspekty uprawiania filozofii umysłu w kontekście nauk kognitywnych, 
[in:] Oblicza racjonalności. Wokół myśli Michała Hellera, red. B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, 
M. L. Hohol, Kraków 2011, p.  51–62; Ł. Kurek, Neurofilozofia jako filozofia w kontekście nauki, [in:] 
Oblicza racjonalności, op. cit., p. 63–82; B. Brożek, Philosophy in neuroscience, [in:] Philosophy in 
science. Methods and applications, ed. B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, Kraków 2011, p. 163–182. 
9 M. Heller, How is philosophy in science possibile?, [in:] Philosophy in science, op. cit., p. 13–24. 
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will. Contemporary neuroscience, on the other hand, does not support the 
mind-body dualism as it demonstrates that many of the cognitive functions 
normally thought of as proper to the activity of the immaterial mind are func-
tions exercised by the material tissue of the brain.10 This position bears the 
name of functionalism. Although I did not specifically elaborate on this point, 
the demise of the mind-body dualism in the cognitive sciences is somewhat 
reminiscent of the non-applicability of the Aristotelian matter/form distinction 
in physics. Clearly then, in both cases an a priori philosophical standpoint 
gives in as the natural sciences yield their precise explanations of the workings 
of the nature.
The differences between philosophizing in the context of physics and the 
cognitive sciences become more transparent as one considers the migration 
of notions between philosophy and the disciplines that contribute to the cog-
nitive sciences. Due to their interdisciplinary character, the cognitive sciences 
comprise a variety of fields of study with their discourse being shaped by con-
cepts of varying proximity to philosophy. As it has been already mentioned, 
physics did naturally absorb many philosophical notions and, by adjusting 
their content, made them fitting to be engaged in formalized physical theories. 
This is not uniformly the case in the cognitive sciences. At some point I state 
the following:
Inasmuch as the concepts used in psychology, cultural or linguistic studies rely 
to a considerable degree on the philosophical conceptual framework, neuro-
science and the computational intelligence in particular, grow out of distinct 
paradigms of science and their content is expressed within conceptual bases not 
rooted in the classical philosophy of mind.11
Such a complex situation results in different philosophical notions working 
their way into the territory of the cognitive sciences with variable success. 
In the context of the classical (folk) philosophical approach, for instance, the 
concepts of the person and of the free will are tightly linked together. It is 
the human person that wills and its acts are elicited without being caused 
so that the agent is capable of choosing otherwise without being in any way 
10 P. S. Churchland, Brain-wise. Studies in neurophilosophy, The MIT Press: Cambridge, 
Massachussets 2002.
11 W. P. Grygiel, Metodologiczne aspekty uprawiania filozofii umysłu w kontekście nauk 
kognitywnych, [in:] Oblicza racjonalności, op. cit., p. 51–62. 
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pre-determined towards any of the available options. Contemporary cognitive 
research seems to be contradicting this idealized notion of the free will and it is 
more consistent with the Humean critics of the free will’s absolute indetermi-
nacy. Antonio Damasio clearly demonstrated that the human act of making 
a choice is conditioned by a complexus of emotional responses thereby blurring 
the classical understanding of the free will as being the higher level intellectual 
appetite in relation to the lower level emotive powers (the concept of somatic 
markers).12 At present, the content of the notion of the free will is evidently 
being refined to reflect the input of the cognitive sciences. Likewise, accord-
ing to the analysis put together by Załuski, the classical concept of the person 
cannot be fully substantiated on the grounds of the biological sciences.13
The history of physics suggests that it is not only the case of spacetime but 
of other previously celebrated notions such as flogiston or ether that at some 
point had played an important heuristic role. Ultimately, the progress of science 
invalidated them as being incapable of explaining newly discovered phenom-
ena. It remains to be seen whether the classical conceptual foundation of the 
philosophy of mind bears an absolute value or the development of the cogni-
tive sciences will call for a in-depth revision of the classical concepts utilized 
to understand the nature of mind. Taking into account the importance of these 
concepts in many areas of the human life (e.g., law, ethics or religion), one can 
hope that following the case of physics, they will turn out to be emergent from 
a yet unknown more fundamental theory of mind.
In the effort to provide a conceptual link to the classical concepts of the phi-
losophy of mind, the cognitive scientists coined out the term neuronal correlate. 
The philosophical import of this term was pointedly discussed by Łukasz Kurek 
in the context of the analysis of neurophilosophy as philosophy exercised in the 
context of neuroscience. Evidently, Kurek treats the problem of the philoso-
phy of mind as philosophy of science narrowed down to a discipline singled 
out of the content of the cognitive sciences mentioned above. Similar analysis 
is offered by Bartosz Brożek with more emphasis on the methodological and 
structural aspects of neuroscience thereby giving better insight into how one 
proceeds in putting together a neuroscientific theory. Since in the next section 
I wish to devote more attention to the precise meaning of the neuroscientific 
experiments as perceived by a physicist, the inquiry into the meaning of the 
12 A. Damasio, Descartes’ error. Emotion, reason, and the human brain, New York 1994.
13 W. Załuski, Pojęcie osoby w świetle nauk biologicznych, [in:] Oblicza racjonalności, op. cit., 
p. 83–98.
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term neuronal correlate provides an opportunity to better explicate the meth-
odological and interpretative issues of what it really is that one obtains as data 
in such experiments.
If, following Kurek, the definition of the neuronal correlate of consciousness 
given by Chalmers is used, the state of the neuronal correlate is matched with 
the state of consciousness.14 From the physical point of view, to know a state 
of a system under study means to know a set of values of physical quantities 
that yield full information on a system at a given instance of time. It is com-
monly accepted that the main goal of neuroscience is to seek out the neuronal 
correlates of consciousness and other mental activities such as free will, emo-
tions or abstract thinking. In other words, one attempts to experimentally 
match the given mental activity with the excitation of a particular fragment 
of the neuronal network present in the physically localizable brain tissue. 
Since the neuroscientific experiments such as fMRI have a strictly physical 
effect as its basis, the measurement returns the information on an altered state 
within the brain tissue as the mental activity under study occurs. Consequently, 
to say that a neuronal correlate was found in such manner faces the difficulty 
of not being able to discriminate among different neuronal correlates yielding 
potentially the same observable states. The upshot of this discussion is that 
as one employs any technique in the cognitive sciences that relies on the 
measurement of physical quantities one gains access to the states of objects 
that one assumes to cause the observables and not to the object themselves 
as it is proper to the classical philosophical analysis.
A cognitive experiment:  
functional magnetic resonance imaging
Every cognitive scientist realizes that many of the experimental methods 
commonly used in the cognitive sciences utilize strictly physical effects. Three 
techniques play the leading role: (1) EEG – electroencephalography, (2) PET – 
positron emission tomography and (3) fMRI – functional magnetic resonance 
imaging. Due to fMRI’s greatest versatility and image precision, this technique 
will be discussed as an exemplary one. The technique allows for the study 
of the brain activation processes so that they can be correlated with the brain’s 
14 D. Chalmers, What is a neural correlate of consciousness?, [in:] Neural correlates of consciousness. 
Empirical and conceptual questions, ed. T. Metzinger, Cambridge, MA 2000, p. 18. 
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cognitive functions already adverted to in the previous section.15 Before the 
core analysis is carried out, however, a terminological preliminary seems to be 
in order. The name functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is already 
a twofold derivative with respect to how it is used originally in physics and 
chemistry, namely, the nuclear magnetic resonance abbreviated as NMR. Firstly, 
The term imaging brings in the fact that by means of a highly sophisticated 
digital techniques, the experimental response is processed to yield an image 
of a structural change of the brain’s tissue induced by its excitation or a patho-
logical change. The nuclear magnetic resonance technique has gained a tremen-
dous popularity in organic chemistry and biochemistry for the NMR spectra 
of organic molecules reflect their structure in a very precise way and allow 
for a straightforward interpretation. Secondly, the term functional singles out 
a very specific one from a variety of imaging techniques that is specifically 
designed to trace the brain activity through the analysis of the corresponding 
changes in the blood flow.
The physical theory that governs the fundamental effect in fMRI and in all 
magnetic resonance techniques is quantum mechanics. According to this theory, 
each nucleus possesses a net spin magnetic moment with degenerate values 
described by the spin quantum numbers. As a nucleus with a non-zero net 
magnetic moment is placed in an external magnetic field, the degeneracy 
is removed and transitions are observed between the different spin states. 
Any college level textbook can be consulted for further theoretical as well 
as technical details.16 What is the most important, however, is that the state 
splitting pattern as well as some dynamical magnetic properties of the nuclei 
depends on the symmetry of the external magnetic field. In particular, the 
corresponding physical parameters of a given nucleus are a precise function 
of the distribution of the surrounding spin magnetic moments. Consequently, 
the nuclear magnetic resonance is a technique that permits the study of the 
environment of selected nuclei by analyzing the splitting pattern produced 
by an external magnetic field of the surrounding atomic nuclei in a particle 
of interest.
Inasmuch as physics yields the theoretical basis for NMR, it is chemistry 
that translates the data into the structure of molecules. This is an important 
interpretative step for the structure of the magnetic resonance spectral lines 
15 For a solid introduction into the imaging techniques see: Handbook of functional neuroimaging 
of cognition, ed. R. Cabeza, A. Kingstone, Cambridge, MA 2006.
16 Cf. J. Keeler, Understanding NMR spectroscopy, Chichester 2005.
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is being mapped into a molecular model where atoms are visualized as balls, 
bonds as sticks connecting the atoms. Such a model is of little or no impor-
tance for a physicist but it is a great heuristic tool for a chemist allowing for the 
formulation of chemical laws explaining the properties of molecules and the 
mechanisms of chemical reactions. Although the magnetic resonance effect 
is generated at the atomic level, its explanative power transfers upon more 
complex structures of chemical molecules. In other words, the experimental 
control over the level of single atoms yields information on the emergent 
structures of molecules whose properties are irreducible to that level. In or-
ganic chemistry, for instance, two versions of NMR are most useful for obvious 
reasons: 1H-NMR and 13C-NMR. It is also worth mentioning that the magnetic 
resonance effects in these techniques operate at distances of approximately 
1 nm (10–9 m). Moreover, the size of the molecule water that will be central 
to the following discussion is slightly more than 1Å (10–10 m).
The interpretative complexity increases considerably as one shifts to the 
analysis of the magnetic resonance data in neuroscience. As it has been already 
pointed out, the main aim of such a study is to identify the regions of the brain 
that become activated as the brain exercises its standard cognitive functions. 
Indeed, the use of the fMRI as well as other techniques has greatly improved 
our knowledge of the regions of the brain responsible for these functions. 
Seeing a color change on the screen of the fMRI as a response to a particular 
mental activity is surely rewarding, but being able to fully understand the 
data acquisition process and to properly interpret them calls for an in-depth 
methodological analysis. The first reason is that the path between applying 
a magnetic impulse to the brain and stating that “here is where it thinks” is a lot 
more complex than, for instance, distinguishing between two isomers of an 
organic compound with the same atomic composition.
In the first approximation, the extent of that path can be ascertained by sim-
ply realizing that the resonance effect takes place at the nanometer scale while 
the fMRI output points to regions of the brain within the range of at least 
milimeters. This amounts to eight orders of magnitude. Furthermore, the 
biological structure such as the neuronal tissue of the brain does not as an 
entity participate in the production of the resonance effect. The fMRI appara-
tus is tuned in to reflect the changes of the environment of the specific atoms 
of hydrogen in the molecules of water whereby the technique principally 
remains the 1H-NMR with the difference that it is not the absorption spec-
trum of transitions between the states of nuclei that is measured but a certain 
relaxation parameter upon the application of the magnetic pulse. Be that as it 
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may, the hydrogen atoms of water serve only as environmental probes to iden-
tify a biological activity on a higher level of complexity. Two crucial steps lie 
in the way between the actual object of interest, that is the brain activity and 
the proper environment that alters the state of the hydrogen atoms giving the 
measurable resonance effect (1) the increased brain activity results in the 
growth of the oxygen demand in the corresponding areas of the brain and (2) 
the blood the contains more oxygenated hemoglobin has different magnetic 
properties as compared to that not carrying oxygen. Let us look at these steps 
in a more detail. The first step linking the brain activity with the consumption 
of oxygen relies on the well documented research that both the flux as well 
as the level of the oxygen-enriched blood correlate with the neuronal activity 
of the brain.17 The second step takes advantage of the fact that hemoglobin 
without oxygen (deoxyhemoglobin) is highly paramagnetic due to the high spin 
of the hem’s iron while hemoglobin with attached oxygen (oxyhemoglobin) 
is diamagnetic due to its low spin. As the concentration of the deoxyhemo-
globin varies in the blood, it causes the change in the spin echo (T2) and the 
gradient echo (T2*) relaxation times that are in turn picked up by the fMRI 
instrument. This phenomenon bears the name of BOLD (Blood Oxygenation 
Level Dependent) and was first proposed as a tool of the functional study of the 
brain by Ogawa et. al.18 There exists a vast literature discussing the theoretical 
and practical complexity of the fMRI techniques that reaches far beyond what 
was presented here.19 With the presented amount of detail at hand, however, 
it becomes possible to sketch an interpretative scheme operative in the fMRI 
studies of the cognitive functions of the brain:
Neuronal activity (NA) → Hemoglobin (Hb) → water (1H-NMR) → Resonance 
Imaging (IM) → Brain’s Image on the screen (BE).
There are many other experimental techniques in biology and medicine 
that involve the interpretative path of such complexity and there are well 
17 S. A. Huettel, A. W. Song, G. McCarthy, Functional magnetic resonance imaging, Sunderland, 
MA 2009.
18 S. Ogawa, T. M. Lee, A. K. Kay, D. W. Tank, Brain magnetic resonance imaging with contrast 
dependent on blood oxygenation, “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA)” 1990 
no. 87, p. 9868–9872. 
19 Cf. W. Bechtel, Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: why is important?, 
„Philosophy of Science” 69 (2002) no. S3, p. S48–S58. 
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documented grounds to suppose that fMRI yields the desired information 
on the neuronal activity under study. What needs to be pointed out, however, 
is the resulting combination of the different levels of molecular and biological 
structures that is involved in the ultimate assignment of the observed data 
on the fMRI’s screen to the neuronal activity. What one actually sees on the 
screen is the spatial distribution of hydrogen atoms of the water molecules that 
respond to the change of the local magnetic field in their vicinity that affects 
the magnetic properties of the nuclei. More precisely, these are their states 
represented by a spin that directly participate in the exchange of energy with 
the incoming magnetic pulse. These states, in turn, are affected by the spin 
of the hemoglobin molecule dependent on the presence of the oxygen atom.
A methodological summary
Two methodological issues need to be addressed at this point. First, all physical 
magnetic resonance effects refer to the states of the corresponding molecules. 
It means that as soon as one leaves the domain of physical explanation and 
switches to the area of biology (as is the case of the blood flow and ultimately 
the neuronal activity), the explanation regards the interaction of objects such 
as hemoglobin, blood cells and finally the brain tissue. What remains a ques-
tion, however, is how the quantum mechanical discourse regarding the spin 
states of the resonating nuclei is made consistent with the object oriented 
language of a biological description of the blood flow and the neuronal activity 
in the end. Secondly, the reason of this state of affairs most likely lies in the 
fact that, although the physical and biological descriptions are conceptually 
inconsistent, there exists a deeper unity between microscopic and macroscopic 
levels. In other words, there are yet unknown laws of nature that show the 
macroscopic level to be emergent from the microscopic one. Roger Penrose 
is the foremost proponent of such a stance.20 Possibly, the reason for the present 
conceptual disunity in the discourse of the cognitive sciences is caused by the 
limited and fragmentary access of our scientific language into the workings 
of the nature. This does not imply, however, that unity does not reign at the 
most fundamental level of the physical reality.
20 R. Penrose, The large, the small and the human mind, Cambridge, MA 1997, p. 84. 
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Abstract
The contemporary research in neurobiology heavily rests on the application of complex 
experimental techniques. The primary aim is to determine the neuronal correlates 
of various mental phenomena such as abstract thinking, consciousness, free will 
etc. The application of the contemporary research in neurobiology to understand 
the nature and the function of the brain is currently having a strong impact on the 
classical philosophical discourse carried out in area of the philosophy of mind. 
In this article, a short analysis of one of the most widely used techniques in the 
neurobiological research is presented, namely, the functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). The particular emphasis is to point out to the conceptual difficulties 
that arise between the language used at the experimental level (spins, molecules) 
and how this language might acquire its meaning to eventually refer to the mental 
phenomena represented by appropriate neuronal structures revealed in the experi-
ment. The apparent disunity will be most likely remedied as a more unified theory 
relating mental phenomena to the specificity of the most fundamental level of the 
physical reality becomes available.
Bibliography
Bechtel W., Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: why is 
important?, “Philosophy of Science” 69 (2002) no. S3, p. S48–S58.
Brożek B., Philosophy in neuroscience, [in:] Philosophy in science. Methods and appli-
cations, ed. B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, Kraków 2011, p. 163–182.
Butterfield J., Isham C., Spacetime and the philosophical challenge of quantum gravi-
ty, [in:] Physics meets philosophy at the planck scale, ed. C. Callender, N. Huggett, 
Cambridge, MA 2001, p. 33–89.
Chalmers D., What is a neural correlate of consciousness?, [in:] Neural correlates of 
consciousness. Empirical and conceptual questions, ed. T. Metzinger, Cambridge, 
MA 2000, p. 17–39.
Churchland P. S., Brain-wise. Studies in neurophilosophy, Cambridge, MA 2002.
Cosmides L., Tooby J., Beyond intuition and instinct blindness. Toward an evolutionarily 
rigorous cognitive science, “Cognition” 1994 no. 50, p. 41–77.
Damasio A., Descartes’ error. Emotion, reason, and the human brain, New York 1994.
Davies B., Some recent articles about platonism, “EMS Newsletter” 2009 no. 64, p. 24–27.
Grygiel W. P., Metodologiczne aspekty uprawiania filozofii umysłu w kontekście nauk 
kognitywnych, [in:] Oblicza racjonalności. Wokół myśli Michała Hellera, red. B. Bro-
żek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, M. L. Hohol, Kraków 2011, p. 51–62.
The cognitive sciences and their method…
 
131
Handbook of functional neuroimaging of cognition, ed. R. Cabeza, A. Kingstones, 
Cambridge, MA 2006.
Heller M., How is philosophy in science possibile?, [in:] Philosophy in science. Methods 
and applications, ed. B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, Kraków 2011, p. 13–24.
Huettel S. A., Song A. W., McCarthy G., Functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
Sunderland, MA 2009.
Keeler J., Understanding NMR spectroscopy, Chichester 2005.
Kurek Ł., Neurofilozofia jako filozofia w kontekście nauki, [in:] Oblicza racjonalności. 
Wokół myśli Michała Hellera, red. B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, M. L. Hohol, 
Kraków 2011, p. 63–82.
Maurer A. A., Medieval philosophy, Toronto 1982.
Mumford D., Why I am a platonist, “EMS Newsletter” 2008 no. 70, p. 27–30.
Ogawa S., Lee T. M., Kay A. K., Tank D. W., Brain magnetic resonance imaging with 
contrast dependent on blood oxygenation, “Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences (USA)” 1990 no. 87, p. 9868–9872.
Penrose R., The large, the small and the human mind, Cambridge, MA 1997.
Penrose R., The road to reality, New York 2005.
Quine W.V.O., On what there is, ”Review of Metaphysics” 1948 vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 21–38.
The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences, ed. R. A. Wilson, F. C. Keil, Cambridge, 
MA 1999.
Wigner E. P., The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, 
“Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics” 1960 no. 13, p. 1–14.
Załuski W., Pojęcie osoby w świetle nauk biologicznych, [in:] Oblicza racjonalności. 
Wokół myśli Michała Hellera, red. B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, M. L. Hohol, 
Kraków 2011, p. 83–98.
